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7 The Role of the Government 
in Promoting Industrialization 
and Human Capital 
Accumulation in Korea 
Joon-Kyung Kim, Sang Dal Shim, and Jun-I1 Kim 
7.1 Introduction 
Korea’s economic growth performance in the past 30 years has been cited 
as an exemplary model of rapid economic development and has been termed 
an “economic miracle.” Lucas (1993) even constructed a model for the occur- 
rence of economic miracles based on the Korean growth example. 
Korea started its process of economic development in the early 1960s with 
a small industrial base and little accumulated capital and technology. The post- 
war division of the country severed whatever industrial link existed between 
the north and south, and the Korean War (1950-53) almost completely de- 
stroyed the production facilities and infrastructure of the economy. In the 
1950s, many foreign observers regarded the Korean economy as hopeless. Un- 
til the early 1960s, the economy depended on foreign economic aid, and its per 
capita income was less than $100, which lagged behind that of many African 
countries (including Ghana and Kenya), not to mention most Latin American 
countries. Korea, perhaps with Taiwan, is one of the few countries that grew 
from poverty to industrial strength comparable to advanced OECD countries. 
Identifying the factors behind Korea’s fast growth is a task of paramount 
interest to both policymakers and academic researchers. In academic circles, 
there has been a renewal of interest in identifying the factors that determine 
growth after the publication of Romer’s paper (1986), which sparked a signifi- 
cant amount of research on “endogenous growth.” According to the theory of 
endogenous growth, one of the key factors generating fast growth is human 
capital accumulation through learning by doing, or on-the-job training, as well 
as education. The accumulation of human capital can be accelerated through 
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international trade, which expands and diversifies the production frontier and 
hence provides excellent opportunities for fast learning. Grossman and Help- 
man (1989, 1990) identified knowledge spillovers from advanced to devel- 
oping countries as the most important gains from trade. Lucas (1993) stressed 
the importance of becoming a large-scale exporter, as it allows workers and 
managers to continue taking on new tasks, which enables sustained learning 
on the job. 
Government assistance can also affect the speed of human capital accumula- 
tion. In order to maintain a high rate of learning, people need to change jobs, 
which necessitates the continuous introduction of new industries and new 
products, requiring different skills and technologies. But the creation of these 
new industries is subject to high risks. The government’s assistance can encour- 
age private industrialists to undertake new projects by reducing the risk they 
face. Thus, the diversification of the industrial structure with governmental 
assistance enables the learning process to continue without being subject to 
diminishing returns. 
The role of governmental assistance has been given little attention in the 
endogenous growth theory literature. In practice, the most successful econo- 
mies, such as those of the East Asian countries, were not only big exporters 
but were those whose governments extensively supported exports and industri- 
alization. This paper attempts to identify the factors behind the rapid Korean 
growth and interpret the Korean experience within this framework, while giv- 
ing special attention to the contribution that Korean government policies made 
in accelerating economic growth. It will also explore the negative side effects 
of such policies. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 7.2 will discuss the socio- 
economic factors that contributed to the Korean work ethic and heightened 
educational zeal. Section 7.3 will discuss policy measures that were adopted 
from the 1960s to the 1970s to promote exports and industrialization. Section 
7.4 evaluates the effectiveness of these policy measures in accelerating human 
capital accumulation and economic growth in Korea. It also discusses distribu- 
tional issues and other side effects of such government interventions, which 
need to be addressed for the formation of future developmental policies. 
7.2 Socioeconomic Factors and Human Capital Accumulation 
The socioeconomic environment can affect human capital accumulation. 
Unlike countries like India, where there is a caste system which precludes a 
person from advancing in social status, the class distinction between the noble 
and ordinary people was largely destroyed in Korea during Japanese colonial 
rule (1910-45). The destruction of the traditional social hierarchy played a 
major role in motivating Koreans to invest in human capital. 
Just before liberation in 1945, 90 percent of industrial assets were under 
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Japanese ownership, and the rest belonged to a handful of Korean landowners. 
Between 1949 and 195 1, land was distributed to poor farmers through the Land 
Reform Bill and large landowners disappeared. As mentioned before, most of 
the industrial and capital base was devastated during the Korean War, resulting 
in the extreme poverty of all people. As a result, Korea saw an unusual equal- 
ization in assets and income in the 1950s and became a rare case among devel- 
oping countries. 
Korea has maintained one of the world’s most competitive educational sys- 
tems, in which access to higher education is determined by a uniform standard. 
With few exceptions, access is determined by the applicant’s score on a na- 
tional exam-unlike in Western countries where multiple standards such as 
family background, extracurricular activities, alumni connections, and leader- 
ship skills are considered. 
Such an environment of equal status with fair competition created great po- 
tential for vertical mobility in society: the general public was given almost 
equal opportunity and strong incentives to move up the “status ladder” by in- 
vesting in human capital or by entrepreneurial activities.’ Of course, human 
capital accumulation and active business promotion at the individual level 
would have been unlikely if the government had initiated the economic devel- 
opment process within a socialist framework, rather than a capitalist one.2 
7.3 Government Policies for Industrialization 
7.3.1 Export Promotion 
From the beginning of the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 
1962, the Korean government has adopted an export promotion strategy rather 
than an import substitution p01icy.~ The government strongly supported ex- 
porting firms with various incentive measures, including favorable treatment 
in the allocation of credit and in the taxation system. 
The system of export financing played a critical role in supporting export 
industries until the mid-1980s when the Korean current account recorded a 
surplus. The essence of the system was the Bank of Korea’s (BOK’s) automatic 
rediscounting policy, which supplied credit via commercial banks to exporting 
firms who received letters of credit (L/C). The central bank‘s discount loans 
1. This argument resembles the convergence results in neoclassical growth models in which 
poor economies with lower capital-labor ratios grow faster than rich countries, converging to the 
same steady state, other things being equal. In endogenous growth models, however, absolute 
convergence results are not obtained because steady state growth itself depends on saving rates 
and other model parameters. 
2. In 1960, North Korea dominated South Korea in terms of production capacity and per capita 
GNP. Such dominance, however, was reversed in the early 1970s. 
3. Export promotion was largely dictated by the need to finance the imports required to build 
up industrial capacity. 
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Table 7.1 Export Loans by Domestic Money Banks (%) 
1961-65 1966-72 1973-81 1982-86 1987-91 
Export loans by BOK (as a share 
of export loans by DMBs) 
Export loans by DMBs (as a 
share of total loans by DMBs) 
Export loans by DMBs (as a 
share of total policy loans' by 
DMBs) 
Export loan interest rate (A) 
General loan interest rate (B) 
B - A  
Financial subsidy ratio for 
exportsb 
Annual export growth rate' 
Export/GNP 
n.a. 
4.5 
n.a. 
9.3 
18.2 
8.9 
n.a. 
40.3 
3.5 
75.4 90.1 65.8 
7.6 13.3 10.2 
n.a. 20.4 16.5 
6.1 9.7 10.0 
23.2 17.3 10-11.5 
17.1 7.6 0-1.5 
1.6 0.6 0.5 
37.1 35.1 10.5 
9.9 26.2 32.5 
45.3 
3.1 
4.5 
10-1 1 .o 
10-1 1.5 
0-0.5 
0.2 
16.4 
30.7 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (Seoul, various issues). 
"The size of policy loans is estimated for earmarked credit such as export credits, National Invest- 
ment Fund loans, housing loans, and credit for agriculture, fisheries, and small and medium- 
sized companies. 
bThe financial subsidy ratio is estimated by dividing the total amount of financial subsidy for 
exports by the total export value. The amount of financial subsidy is calculated by multiplying the 
size of export-related loans by the interest rate differential between the average borrowing rate for 
the manufacturing industry and interest rates for export-related loans. 
'Annual export growth rate during 1953-60 was 8.2 percent. 
were also extended to preshipment exports, as well as to imports of raw materi- 
als and intermediate goods for export use and to the purchase of export content 
from local ~uppliers.~ 
Table 7.1 shows that most of the export credit extended by domestic money 
banks (DMBs) were supported by the central bank. Between 1966 and 1986, 
the annual average ratio of BOK export credits to DMB export loans was 79.4 
percent. In particular, the ratio reached 90.1 percent in the 1973-81 period. 
Table 7.1 also shows DMB export loans as a share of total DMB loans. Be- 
tween 1961 and 1965, the annual average share was only 4.5 percent. The share 
increased to 7.6 percent in the 1966-72 period and further, to 13.3 percent, in 
the 1973-81 period. The share, however, has decreased significantly since the 
mid-l980s, when the current account surplus began accumulating. 
The interest rate on export loans was also heavily subsidized. Until 1981, 
export loans were provided at rates of 6-10 percent even though general loan 
rates were 17-23 percent. After 1982, the differential disappeared (see table 
4. In addition to this explicitly earmarked export credit program, the government guided the 
banks through moral suasion, directives, or communication to lend to exporters to support their 
fixed investment as well as working capital. See Rhee (1989) and Cho and Kim (1993) for a 
detailed description of Korea's export credit policy. 
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7.1). Given the facts that the availability of credit was what mattered and that 
the curb-market rates usually exceeded 30 percent, the preferential treatment 
given to exporters was far greater than that implied by the above-mentioned 
differentials alone. 
It is interesting to see in table 7.1 that there is some positive correlation 
between export growth and export loan support, in terms of its availability and 
the extent of preferential treatment. Between 1961 and 1981, exports grew 
about 35-40 percent per annum and their share in GNP increased by more 
than seven times. However, the growth rate has dropped to the 10 percent level 
since 1982. 
Such fast export growth in the 1960s and 1970s was not due solely to these 
export credit programs. The government also provided substantial tax incen- 
tives to exporting firms by reducing business and corporate taxes on export 
income by 50 percent and exempting tariffs on materials or intermediate goods 
imported as export content. Furthermore, exporters were exempted from tax 
investigations, which motivated business firms to restlessly participate in ex- 
porting. 
In addition to these incentives, there was also a long list of governmental 
measures for export activity promotion at the microlevel. Since export market- 
ing has substantial fixed costs in the beginning stages, the government estab- 
lished the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) mainly to explore 
foreign markets. To assist Korean exporters in effectively filling foreign orders, 
the government also subsidized projects to improve the wrapping and design 
of products, the expansion of inspection facilities for export goods, the opening 
of foreign-language training centers, and traveling expenses for delegations to 
overseas expositions and trade shows? 
The government also initiated close consultation with the export industries 
and monitored the performance of supported firms through “monthly export 
promotion expansion meetings,” chaired by the president. Ministers with trade- 
related duties, representatives from business, banking institutions, and ship- 
ping companies, and labor-union leaders participated in these meetings to re- 
view export performance broken down according to product and destination, 
and to discuss international market trends and emerging problems. For in- 
stance, if export performance was weak, the president urged relevant govem- 
ment officials and bankers to provide enhanced support to achieve a target 
volume of exports as planned. Through the process of consensus building in 
these meetings, export promotion policies were systemized (Kim 1 990).6 
Another salient feature of Korean export promotion policies was that the 
5. These broad projects were financed from a sort of semitax on domestic exporter’s imports, 
which was operated by the Korea Trader’s Association (KTA). 
6. The term “Korea Incorporated” was coined mainly because of this unique feature of Korea’s 
export promotion policy implementation: banks acted as a treasury unit, the industrial sector as 
production and marketing units, and the government as a central planning and control unit (Cho 
and Hellmann 1993). 
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government’s support to exporting firms was based on export performance. Ex- 
porters eligible to receive support were limited to those whose past year’s ex- 
ports exceeded a target amount? To get more privileges, exporters had to work 
hard to compete with each other and foreign businesses. In this way, the Korean 
government maintained an efficient allocating device for picking winners and 
was able to reduce the risk of an “interventionist approach” (Cho and Kim 
1993). Furthermore, this strategy compelled Korean firms to compete with for- 
eign firms and brought tremendous externalities of accelerated learning on the 
job and, thus, a shortened learning curve. 
There seems to be little controversy over the fact that these comprehensive 
export promotion policies contributed to the remarkable expansion of the Ko- 
rean export sector by stimulating learning by doing. But one may remain 
doubtful whether the full extent of government subsidies used by Korean poli- 
cymakers was necessary to kick off export growth. 
7.3.2 Promotion of the Heavy and Chemical Industries 
From the beginning of economic development, the Korean military govern- 
ment made deliberate efforts to upgrade the industrial structure by promoting 
the heavy and chemical industries (HCIs). It believed that the build up of the 
HCIs would lead to a “wealthy country and a strong army.” The promotion of 
the HCIs was carried out despite many critical obstacles: (1) Korea lacked 
capital and Korea’s market was very small, while the HCIs require huge capital 
investments with long gestation periods and they are sensitive to scale. (2) 
Technical skills necessary to efficiently produce HCI products were absent in 
Korea. The Korean government designated the steel industry, along with the 
petrochemical industry, strategic industries to be given top priority in the sec- 
ond Five-Year Economic Development Plan ( 1967-71).8 
In the early 1970s, the promotion of the HCIs was further pushed to sustain 
export growth. The Korean industrial structure had rapidly transformed during 
the 1960s from an agrarian economy to a light manufacturing sector- 
dominated economy. But the government suspected that export-led growth 
would not be sustained when the light industries’ production reached the “ef- 
fective minimum scale” and their position of comparative advantage in the 
international market deteriorated. 
The HCI drive was also largely motivated by national security concerns, 
magnified by the Carter administration’s plan to completely withdraw U.S. 
ground forces from Korea and by the fall of South Vietnam to communist rule. 
In response, the Korean government announced in 1973 that it would promote 
the HCIs simultaneously with the defense industry. 
7. The general trading companies introduced in 1972 had favorable access to various govern- 
ment supports. But their licenses had to be renewed every year. Those that had not exported beyond 
a certain amount found their licenses revoked. (Cho and Kim 1993). 
8. Pohang Integrated Steel Mill (POSCO) and Wulsan Petrochemical Complex were built dur- 
ing the second Five-Year Plan. 
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The government’s key strategy for developing the HCIs was raising factory 
sizes to international standards, in order to promote their competitive edge. 
Since the domestic market was too small for these large factories, the govern- 
ment decided that the HCIs were to be promoted as strategic export industries 
to solve marketing problems and to practice economies of scale (Kim 1990).9 
The HCI policy was implemented through subsidized credit and special tax 
policies, selective protection, entry restrictions, and direct government involve- 
ment in industrial decision making. The government picked chueboZs (con- 
glomerates) or firms to enter specific industries. 
Among various government supports, financing was the most critical factor 
since the HCIs required huge amounts of capital. With limited domestic sav- 
ing, the government had to actively seek foreign capital. At that time, the abil- 
ity of Korean entrepreneurs to attract foreign capital was very limited due to 
the low creditworthiness of domestic firms. The government, in response, took 
two big steps. It began to guarantee the reimbursement of all foreign loans, 
whether they were initiated by public companies or by private companies. 
Much more important, the government normalized relations with Japan, de- 
spite very strong anti-Japan sentiment and popular protest.’O These measures 
facilitated large inflows of foreign capital and technology, especially from 
Japan. 
Table 7.2 shows the allocation of foreign loans by industry. From 1959 to 
1982, commercial loans were mostly allocated to the manufacturing industries, 
especially to the HCIs, while public loans went mainly to the service industry 
(mostly for infrastructure). During this period, 59 percent of all commercial 
loans were distributed to manufacturing industries, of which 73.8 percent were 
allocated to HCI-related projects, indicating that, without easy access to inter- 
national commercial lending, the HCI plan which required mammoth invest- 
ment could not have been implemented. 
The government also established a special system called the National Invest- 
ment Fund (NIF) in 1973 to facilitate the financing of long-term investment in 
plants and equipment for the HCIs. The sources of the NIF were a combination 
of domestic funds from private financial intermediaries such as commercial 
9. In particular, the HCI build-up in parallel with the defense industry was a challenge because 
production capacity could stay idle in peacetime. In order to prevent unnecessary idle capacity, 
the Korean government devised a scheme to make use of portions of the capacity of private- 
operated factories in the HCIs to produce certain parts of weapons. In fact, the government desig- 
nated 82 large- and medium-sized firms as part-producing factories. Behind this plan lay the gov- 
ernment’s basic principle that “any weapon could be turned into parts when taken apart,” and 
“when any standard parts were assembled, they turned into weapons with good performance.” In 
order to maintain the sound financial structure of parts-producing factories by not letting produc- 
tion capacity stay idle in peacetime, firms followed a rule that 20 percent of their total production 
capacity was to be for military use and the rest for civilian use (Kim 1990). 
10. The construction of POSCO, which has grown to become the third largest steel company in 
the world, could not have begun without the reparation fund settled in the normalization treaty with 
Japan. See Cho and Kim (1993) for the details of the government’s financial support of POSCO. 
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Table 7.2 Composition of Public and Commercial Foreign Loans by Industry 
(on the basis of arrival; %) 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture, Forestry, Light 
and Fisheries HCIs Industries Service Total 
1959-66 
Public loan 
Commercial loan 
Public loan 
Commercial loan 
Public loan 
Commercial loan 
Public loan 
Commercial loan 
Public loan 
Commercial loan 
Total 
1967-7 1 
1972-76 
1977-82 
1959-82 
7.5 
22.3 
42.2 
3.6 
18.2 
2.2 
17.0 
0.6 
19.0 
1.6 
9.6 
11.7 8.3 
43.4 31.4 
6.8 1.6 
31.6 23.9 
6.1 0.0 
42.4 23.7 
1.5 0.3 
46.0 10.6 
3.0 0.4 
43.6 15.4 
24.9 8.5 
72.5 100.0 
2.9 100.0 
49.4 100.0 
40.8 100.0 
75.8 100.0 
31.7 100.0 
81.2 100.0 
42.8 100.0 
77.6 100.0 
39.5 100.0 
57.0 100.0 
Source: Cha (1986). 
banks and insurance companies and government funds, but predominantly the 
former. During 1974-81, the NIF mainly supplied equipment loans to facilitate 
construction of the HCIs, specifically the steel, petrochemical, and shipbuild- 
ing industries." As shown in table 7.3, the share of NIF equipment loans to 
HCIs in total equipment loans supplied from the banking sector reached 70 
percent at the end of 1970s. Since the mid-l980s, as the construction of the 
HCIs was mostly completed, the share of NIF equipment loans gradually de- 
clined to 11.4 percent at the end of 1991. The NIF also provided a sizeable 
amount of equipment loans to the electric power industry in order to meet the 
sharp increase in demand for electricity related to the construction of the HCIs. 
Along with massive credit supports, the government overhauled the educa- 
tion and training systems to promote and secure engineers and skilled workers 
for the HCIs. Training centers, technical high schools, and engineering col- 
11. After 1982, most of the NIF loans were supplied to many unspecified firms for the purchas- 
ing of domestically produced machinery and postshipment export financing. This change in alloca- 
tion was caused by the following two factors: First, the need to support factory construction dimin- 
ished as the HCI plants were mostly completed by the early 1980s, while it was still necessary to 
support sectors that marketed HCI-related products. Second, as the government's direct promotion 
of "strategic" firms and industries with preferential credits gave way to more indirect and func- 
tional support of unspecified firms after the early 1980s, the mode of NIF operation also changed 
from firm- and industry-specific support to function-specific support (Cho and Kim 1993). 
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Table 7.3 Share of NIF Loans in Total Loans by the Banking Sector (%) 
HCIs Power and Gas Industries 
Year Total Loans Equipment Loans Total Loans 
1974 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1988 
1990 
1991 
6.1 
16.6 
25.1 
21.4 
21.2 
20.3 
15.2 
12.3 
7.1 
4.9 
25.3 
54.2 
70.6 
67.3 
64.1 
55.9 
36.7 
26.6 
14.8 
11.4 
10.8 
38.2 
52.7 
59.9 
67.3 
49.5 
30.7 
24.7 
18.1 
8.1 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Overview of the National Investment Fund (Seoul, 1989); Bank of Korea, 
Monthly Bulletin (Seoul, various issues); Korea Development Bank, Monthly Bulletin (Seoul, 
various issues). 
Note: Loans reported are those oustanding at the end of each year and include loans from the 
DMBs and the Korea Development Bank. 
leges were expanded both in quality and quantity. Specifically, the government 
imposed vocational training requirements on private sector firms to expand the 
supply of skilled labor for the HCIs. As a result, the number of in-plant voca- 
tional trainees drastically increased in 1976, reaching an annual level of almost 
100,000. Large numbers of workers continued to be trained from 1977 to 1980, 
averaging about 70,000 annually (see table 7.4). The government also intro- 
duced a skills licensing system to encourage every Korean worker to possess 
at least one skill. In addition, for each field of engineering the government 
actively recruited outstanding Korean scientists abroad and established a mod- 
ern laboratory where research on the improvement of production technologies 
was conducted in collaboration with industry researchers and university pro- 
fessors. Industrial parks were built to house the HCIs because (1) HCIs have 
strong forward and backward linkages among themselves, (2) they require 
large-scale social overhead capital for water, electricity, and transportation 
networks, and (3) some of the factories produce a great deal of pollution 
(Kim 1990). 
These concerted efforts by the government helped to institute a rapid change 
in the industrial structure toward the HCIs. As shown in table 7.5, the share of 
the HCIs in GDP was only 11.9 percent in 1970, but increased to 26.3 percent 
in 1980, which exceeded the share of light industry, and the HCI share further 
increased to 31.3 percent in 1988. The HCI drive also contributed in stimulat- 
ing import substitution of HCIs. The import coefficient dropped from 36.9 
percent in 1970 to 23.7 percent in 1980, and further decreased to 21.6 percent 
in 1985. Furthermore, the share of HCI products in total exports rose substan- 
tially from 12.8 percent in 1970 to 51.4 percent in 1988. These results indicate 
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Table 7.4 Vocational Training in Korea (thousand persons) 
Public In-Plant 
Year Vocational Training Vocational Training 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1.5 
7.9 
9.7 
11.5 
15.6 
16.1 
25.1 
27.1 
32.6 
28.8 
14.9 
19.2 
28.6 
31.1 
26.3 
28.1 
24.7 
22.8 
22.6 
22.9 
22.6 
20.7 
20.1 
24.4 
26.0 
3.9 
8.1 
8.8 
13.6 
14.7 
11.3 
14.5 
13.2 
42.7 
96.8 
58.7 
73.0 
91.0 
66.2 
48.4 
30.1 
21.0 
20.8 
23.9 
19.0 
14.2 
18.2 
15.0 
25.7 
43.3 
Source: Lee (1992). 
that Korea has achieved a sort of miracle by developing a full set of industries 
(the light industries, HCIs, and defense industry) in the short period since 
1962, the year of the light industry take-off. 
Such a drastic transformation of industrial structure could be regarded as an 
engine of Korea’s high sustained economic growth. It introduced new products 
in the market and generated technology spillovers to other industries, which 
accelerated the process of human capital accumulation. Since the HCI drive 
was pursued with a view to building strategic large-scale export industries, the 
manufacturers could enjoy scale economies and enhanced technology 
spillover. 
The effect of the HCI drive on growth, however, is not free from controversy. 
Prevalent criticisms include inappropriate scale choices, excessively capital- 
intensive investments in targeted sectors, and the retardation of trade and fi- 
nancial liberalization. Nonetheless, the HCIs became the leading export sector 
in Korea starting in the mid-1980s and large-scale industrial firms with interna- 
tional reputations-POSCO, Samsung, and Hyundai-were developed within 
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Table 7.5 Trend of Development of the HCIs (%) 
Industry 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 
Agriculturdfishery 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Light 
HCIs 
Petrochemical 
Basic metal 
MetaVmachinery 
Power/gas/construction 
Service 
Total 
Light 
HCIs 
Petrochemical 
Basic metal 
MetaVmachinery 
Light 
HCIs 
Petrochemical 
Basic metal 
Metaumachinery 
Industrial Structure 
17.0 12.8 8.3 
1.1 0.9 0.8 
40.3 50.4 51.0 
28.4 29.5 24.7 
11.9 20.9 26.3 
5.9 10.8 12.6 
2.0 3.4 5.1 
4.0 6.7 8.6 
9.8 7.7 10.2 
31.8 28.2 29.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Import Coeflcients” 
9.2 10.6 7.3 
36.9 29.5 23.7 
23.5 19.7 14.9 
35.1 27.6 18.9 
50.5 41.7 35.8 
Composition of Exports 
49.4 45.6 35.2 
12.8 29.0 38.3 
5.4 9.2 9.9 
1.5 4.0 8.1 
5.9 15.8 20.3 
7.7 
0.7 
50.0 
21.7 
28.3 
11.4 
4.9 
12.0 
10.4 
31.2 
100.0 
7.0 
21.6 
17.0 
17.6 
26.9 
30.0 
47.5 
12.4 
5.8 
29.3 
6.3 
0.6 
52.7 
21.4 
31.3 
10.0 
5.3 
16.1 
9.3 
29.4 
100.0 
8.5 
22.5 
19.1 
20.4 
25.1 
29.1 
51.4 
11.0 
5.1 
35.4 
Source: Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables (Seoul, various issues). 
%nport coefficient = (total imporr/total supply of goods to the market) X 100. 
such a short period in part because of the drive. Many also think that, if Korea 
had not built the HCIs in the 1970s, it may not have been able to take full 
advantage of the appreciation of the Japanese yen and the world economic 
boom in the second half of the 1980s. 
7.3.3 
Risks and uncertainties have far-reaching implications for economic growth 
as private firms are not able to invest in high-risk projects. In the absence of a 
well-functioning financial market which allows the pooling of risk involved in 
capital investment, one bad draw from a random experiment will drive the in- 
vestor off the scene. The Korean experience suggests how risk sharing between 
the government and private firms can affect the process of rapid industrializa- 
tion and product diversification. 
The Korean government has acted as an active risk partner for all industrial 
firms chosen to participate in strategic projects. In practice, the risk-sharing 
scheme was established by the state’s control over finance. The government 
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Table 7.6 Financial Indicators in the Manufacturing Industry (%) 
Ratio of Debt Ratio of Interest Expenses Ratio of Net Profits 
Year to Equity to Net Sales to Net Sales 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
92.2 
100.5 
83.7 
117.7 
151.2 
20 I .3 
270.0 
328.4 
394.2 
313.4 
272.7 
3 16.0 
339.5 
364.6 
3.0 
4.9 
3.9 
5.7 
5.2 
5.9 
7.8 
9.2 
9.9 
7.1 
4.6 
4.5 
4.9 
4.9 
9.1 
8.6 
7.9 
7.7 
6.7 
6.0 
4.3 
3.3 
1.2 
3.9 
7.5 
4.8 
3.4 
3.9 
Source: Bank of Korea, Financial Stutements Analysis (Seoul, 1981); quoted from Kim (1991) 
"Total liabilitieshet worth. 
owned all major banks, set their interest rates at levels far below market rates, 
and tightly controlled the allocation of their loans and foreign loans. 
As mentioned before, the government fully guaranteed private firms' repay- 
ment of foreign borrowing. It revised the Foreign Capital Inducement Act in 
1965 to allow government-controlled banks to provide debt guarantees without 
the approval of the National Assembly. In this way, large inflows of foreign 
capital were promoted without political interruption, and risky ventures that 
could not be undertaken by private companies alone could be undertaken with 
government support. 
Furthermore, the government, by controlling financial markets, did not hesi- 
tate to bail out whatever strategic firms were financially insolvent. In an econ- 
omy like Korea's, where the initial accumulation of capital was poor and rapid 
investment expansion had to be financed by bank credit and foreign loans, 
firms had highly leveraged financial structures: during the period of initial 
take-off (1963-7 l), the Korean manufacturing sector's debt ratio increased 
more than four times, from 92 percent to 394 percent (see table 7.6). In such a 
credit-based economy, financial crises would occur with major economic 
downturns unless some risk-sharing schemes between creditors and borrow- 
ers existed.'* 
The most dramatic example of the government's direct involvement in risk 
sharing with business firms is the Presidential Emergency Decree of August 
1972, which declared a moratorium on the payments of corporate debt to curb- 
12. In Japan, the "main bank" system helped risk sharing between creditors and borrowers. 
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market lenders. All corporate loans from the curb market were converted to 
long-term loans to be paid on an installment basis over a five-year period with 
a grace period of three years, at a maximum interest rate of 16.2 percent, when 
the prevailing curb-market rate was over 40 percent per annum. In addition, 
approximately 30 percent of the short-term high-interest (15.5 percent per an- 
num) commercial bank loans to businesses were converted to long-term loans 
to be repaid on an installment basis over a five-year period at an 8 percent 
annual interest rate with a three-year grace period. 
Behind this drastic measure was strong pressure from business firms amid 
the worldwide recession at the end of the 1960s. The situation was aggravated 
extremely by the devaluation of the Korean currency by 18 percent in 1971. 
This devaluation, which was prompted by the sharp slowdown in export 
growth, caused a sudden increase in the cost of foreign debt servicing and 
created severe financial constraints on firms, especially those who had bor- 
rowed heavily from abroad.I3 
The August 1972 decree sharply reduced the interest burden of many debt- 
ridden firms. The ratio of interest expenses to sales volume for manufacturing 
firms dropped from 9.9 percent in 1971 to 7.1 percent in 1972 and then to 4.6 
percent in 1973 (see table 7.6). As the financial situation of the corporate sector 
improved, so did the problem of nonperforming loans of banks.I4 
The decree firmly demonstrated that the government would take measures 
to relieve financial distress when necessary. The government’s commitment to 
risk partnership largely motivated private entrepreneurship and allowed the 
credit-based economy and its highly leveraged firms to explore risky invest- 
ment opportunities with long-term objectives in mind. 
The decree, however, also had adverse effects. It raised social equity issues 
as the wealth of the depositors in the curb market and banks was transferred to 
the corporate sector, especially large firms. The fact that there was no profit- 
sharing arrangement in return for the wealth transfer created discontent among 
the public, although this dissatisfaction was suppressed under the authoritarian 
regime. The problem of moral hazard for corporate firms and banks was 
no less serious. The government’s excessive risk partnership with selected 
firms caused these firms not only to overinvest but also to depend heavily 
on the government’s protection and support, leading them to give insuffi- 
cient attention to their investment appraisals. The efficient development of 
the banking system was also hampered, because as long as the government 
was willing to rescue firms, banks had little incentive to screen projects and 
monitor firms. 
13. The amount of the debt service increased from $160 million in 1970 to $230 and $455 
million in 1971 and 1972, respectively. 
14. The economy recovered quickly. Total investment grew by 40 percent, and export growth 
was almost 100 percent in 1973. The real growth of the economy in the first quarter of 1973 
increased to 19.3 percent from 6.4 percent for the same period in 1972. 
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7.4 Appraisal of Korean Industrialization Policy 
We have seen that the remarkable economic growth of Korea was largely 
a result of rapid human capital accumulation driven by on-the-job training. 
Government policies greatly contributed to accelerating this process. Export 
promotion has led to substantial technological spillover, which in turn stimu- 
lated learning by doing. Specifically, the promotion of the HCIs as strategic 
export industries expanded the spectrum of the product mix of the economy 
and provided domestic producers with an excellent ground for practicing scale 
economies, which enabled economic growth to be sustained. The government’s 
active risk sharing with private firms significantly contributed to this successful 
implementation of these policies. 
Korean economic success is also a result of strong market competition 
among private firms. As is well known, the Korean system of resource alloca- 
tion has used government interventions more extensively than any other suc- 
cessful mixed economy, including other newly industrialized countries. Target 
industries and firms in Korea were selected by the government rather than by 
the market. Such government intervention can cause distortive allocations and 
foster moral hazard problems. But, as exporting firms were competing in the 
international market, they had strong incentives to remain cost effective. The 
potential inefficiencies that may arise from the government’s extensive inter- 
ventions were reduced because those selected firms needed to pass market tests 
to survive in the international market. In addition, the government tried to link 
the amount of assistance to the performance of individual firms in the market. 
This practice of picking winners has helped to avoid adverse incentives that 
may arise along with the provision of governmental assistance. 
Although the Korean approach in the 1960s and 1970s has been effective in 
achieving rapid expansion of industrial investment and development of private 
entrepreneurship, it was not costless. The government’s excessive risk sharing 
and assistance to target industries raised social equity issues. It also put a heavy 
burden of nonperforming loans on the banking system. The seriousness of such 
adverse effects, which had been boiling beneath the surface, was recognized 
by the government by the end of 1970s. It prompted the government to shift its 
policy stance from unbalanced to balanced growth. 
In early 1980s, the government first reduced the scope of its financial sup- 
port for exporting industries. Interest subsidies on export loans, mainly for 
large firms, as well as the number of qualified large firms eligible for policy 
loans were reduced. On the other hand, the support for previously disadvan- 
taged sectors such as small and medium-sized companies (SMCs) and housing 
were substantially increa~ed.’~ In particular, the emergence of a current ac- 
count surplus and the political democratization during the second half of the 
15. The government tightened the required ratio of the SMC loans out of banks’ total loans (see 
table 7.7) and inwoduced the National Housing Fund (in 1981) to finance investment in housing 
for low income class households. 
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Table 7.7 Domestic Money Bank Required Ratio of SMC Finance (%) 
Bank S p e  1965 1976 1980 1985 1986 1992 
Nationwide commencal banks 3W 30b 35' 35 35 45 
Local banks 30" 40b 5 9  55 80 80 
Foreign bank branches 25 25 25 
aRatio in terms of total loans outstanding. 
bRatio in terms of increase in total loans. 
cRatio in terms of increase in total loans in won. 
Table 7.8 Loans to SMCs and 30 Largest Chaebols 
by Domestic Money Banks (%) 
Loan Destination 1983 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Loans to SMCs 33.1 31.5 48.1 50.1 55.5 56.8 
Loans to 30 largest chaebols n.a. n.a. 23.7 20.7 19.8 20.4 
Source: Bank of Korea, internal memorandum. 
1980s spurred social demand for equity, which forced the government to fur- 
ther assist the SMC sector while abolishing policy loans for large corpora- 
tions.I6 This step led to a sharp increase in the portion of bank loans to the 
SMCs as a percentage of total bank loans, from 33.1 percent in 1983 to 56.8 
percent in 1991, while gradually reducing the share of bank loans to the chae- 
bols (see table 7.8). 
Such a reversal of policy to one with more a political than an economic 
orientation was caused by the absence of a prearrangement for sharing the 
returns realized from privileges bestowed to selected sectors by the previous 
government. The presumed strategy was to enlarge the pie first and distribute 
it later. But the strong authoritarian government (1961-79), which was able to 
promote growth actively, collapsed before the completion of a fair distribution 
of the pie. Because the democratic government was faced with difficulties in 
redistributing the returns, it allowed privileges to new interest groups with 
strong voices. Such rent-seeking behavior by interest groups discouraged com- 
petition in the market and directed resources away from productivity growth. 
Furthermore, it significantly undermined the traditional values and work ethics 
16. Since 1988, large corporations have been completely excluded from export credit programs. 
At the same time, reflecting severe public criticism against the economic concentration within the 
chaebols, the government began to strictly restrict chaebols' financing and investment. For in- 
stance, the basket control of the credit system (credit ceilings) on large business groups was intro- 
duced in 1987 to limit the share of bank loans going to the nation's 30 largest chaebols. On the 
other hand, the BOK applied a preferential rate of rediscounting the SMC bills, and the govern- 
ment established a structural adjustment support program for the SMCs in 1988 to promote R&D 
and business transformation of the SMCs. 
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which have been crucial for the accumulation of human capital. These two 
adverse effects eventually led to a significant erosion of international competi- 
tiveness of the Korean economy starting in the late 1980s. 
Lucas (1993) claimed that the quicker the introduction of new products into 
the economy, the quicker the process of learning by doing. The Korean experi- 
ence strongly suggests that a government can play an important role in sus- 
taining human capital accumulation through learning on the job and economic 
growth. Such dynamic gains in growth, however, may be at least partially offset 
by distributional problems that arise in the industrialization process unless a 
profit-sharing or ownership-sharing scheme is prearranged. From a long-term 
view, a second-best welfare-enhancing scheme would be to design industrial 
policies along with an adequate tax policy for income redistribution at the out- 
set. Kim (1988) showed that in the presence of credit market failures, lump- 
sum taxes-cum-transfers along with governmental direct financial support for 
private firms can generate an economic growth rate that is higher than it would 
be without collective efforts by the government and the private sector. 
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COElIlleIlt Chia Siow Yue 
This is a very interesting paper, containing many insights on the Korean 
economic miracle. The paper aimed at identifying the factors behind Korea’s 
rapid economic growth, relating the Korean growth experience to endogenous 
growth theory, and evaluating the role of government policies, particularly ex- 
port promotion and industrial policies. 
My comments focus on a number of areas. First, there appears to be consid- 
erable overlap between this paper and Chong-Hyun Nam’s paper (chap. 6 in 
this volume) on the role of trade and exchange rate policy in Korea’s economic 
growth. To minimize overlap, perhaps the authors could focus less on export 
promotion policies and more on policies pertaining to human capital accumu- 
lation and investment. And it would have been enlightening if the authors had 
provided some quantitative evidence on the sources of economic growth in 
Korea and had shown the importance of human capital accumulation and econ- 
omies of scale as stressed by endogenous growth theory. Nam’s paper showed 
that, using Denison’s growth-accounting approach, more than half of the eco- 
nomic growth in Korea could be explained by increases in labor and capital 
factor inputs. He did not estimate the contribution of human capital accumula- 
tion, as distinct from labor, but found that economies of scale accounted for 
about 20 percent of economic growth. 
Second, discussion on the factors explaining Korea’s economic success 
could be expanded to provide greater insight, in view of the widespread interest 
in the economic performance of Asia’s newly industrialized economies (NIEs), 
and possible lessons for the developing world. The paper left unclear the role 
of extensive government intervention in Korea’s success, nor was there evalua- 
tion of the appropriateness of various government policies pertaining to indus- 
trial targeting, manpower development, and technology acquisition and devel- 
opment. 
Third, the authors attempted to correlate human capital accumulation and 
international trade and concluded that Korean economic growth was well ex- 
plained by sustained human capital accumulation plus strong export promo- 
tion. What remains unclear is the role of foreign direct investment and technol- 
ogy imports. Also, what explains the Korean zeal for education? Part of the 
incentive structure for human capital accumulation, as described by the au- 
thors, is the government’s role in providing vocational training as well as im- 
posed training requirements on private firms. The emphasis on vocational 
training is reflected in the high percentage of trained craftsmen among blue- 
collar workers. Secondary school enrollment is an inadequate indicator of hu- 
man capital accumulation, as it omits the role of training and falls short of 
measuring the efficiency of the formal educational system. Based on years of 
schooling alone, the Philippines should have a better record of economic 
Chia Siow Yue is professor of economics at the National University of Singapore. 
198 Joon-Kyung Kim, Sang Dal Shim, and Jun-I1 Kim 
growth performance among East Asian countries. Labor efficiency also de- 
pends on the educational curriculum, on-the-job and off-the-job training, 
labor-management relations, and work ethics. It is to be noted that the Asian 
NIEs placed high priority on vocational, technical, science-based education 
and training to produce an efficient industrial work force. Commentators have 
also drawn attention to the absence of industrial strife as a factor contributing 
to labor productivity and competitiveness in the Asian NIEs. Education expen- 
diture ratios probably underestimate human capital accumulation, as they ig- 
nore forgone labor earnings of students and private expenditures by families 
to supplement the educational services provided by formal schools, such as on 
private tuition. 
Fourth, Lucas was cited as emphasizing the dynamic gains from trade in 
accelerating the learning process through continuing introduction of new tasks 
for workers and managers; the speedier the introduction of new products and 
industries into the economy, the speedier the learning and growth. Is there an 
optimal learning path? Would accelerated industrial upgrading through indus- 
trial policy lead to premature obsolescence of skills? Does the age profile of 
Korea’s industrial work force affect worker attitudes toward industrial restruc- 
turing and commitment to training? How prevalent is job hopping in Korea 
and do high labor turnovers affect management’s commitment to providing 
training? 
Fifth, the authors rightly drew attention to the advantages of the export ori- 
entation strategy in opening up larger markets for Korean firms, so that they 
benefitted from scale economies, while access to technology and a more com- 
petitive environment promoted efficiency. The discussion on export promotion 
policy is enlightening in showing the extent to which the Korean government 
used macro- as well as microtools. The latter may be unique to Korea among 
East Asian economies, extending to measures of export targeting by product 
and country and to conferring decorations and medals on outstanding perform- 
ers. A key to the success of export subsidies in inducing Korean firms to im- 
prove performance is the direct linkage of subsidies to export performance, 
thus ensuring that subsidies go to the most efficient rather than the least effi- 
cient exporters. For a more complete picture of the export promotion policies 
pursued by Korea, the authors may wish not only to focus on the system of 
subsidized credit allocation, but also to make reference to the roles of the pref- 
erential tax system and exchange rate policy. 
Sixth, the authors pointed out that the policy of promoting heavy and chemi- 
cal industries (HCIs) in the early 1970s was greatly motivated by national secu- 
rity concerns and described the comprehensive financial and market support 
measures to divert resources to the HCIs, resulting in the rising shares of HCIs 
in GDP, import substitution and exports, and the technological spillover to 
other industries. Critics of East Asian industrial policy have drawn attention to 
the high cost of the HCI program to Korea. The negative experience with the 
HCIs and growing concern with economic concentration and social equity as 
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well as external pressures have led the Korean government to reorient its indus- 
trial policy away from industry- and firm-specific credit and tax measures and 
support of chaebols to function-specific measures such as support of R&D and 
support of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Seventh, the authors emphasized the importance of risk sharing between 
government and private enterprises and highlighted the role of the Korean gov- 
ernment in guaranteeing the foreign debt repayments of the private sector and 
bailing out financially insolvent firms. Apart from the issue of economic con- 
centration and social equity, the poser is how Korea managed to provide such 
support for its industries and firms without undermining its economic perfor- 
mance, while many countries have gotten into serious economic difficulties for 
doing likewise. 
Finally, will the convergence postulated by the neoclassical growth model 
lead to a slowing down of the Korean growth rate? Will political democratiza- 
tion and the greater demand for social equity in the 1990s hasten the process 
of slowdown? The authors noted that noneconomic factors have dominated 
Korean economic decision making, with rent-seeking behavior by new interest 
groups and erosion of work ethics undermining Korea’s international competi- 
tiveness. They advocated the design of industrial policies with a pie-splitting 
arrangement at the outset. The unanswered question is how the pie sharing is 
to be decided. Perhaps the authors could elaborate in what they meant by the 
“design [of] industrial policies along with adequate tax policies for income 
redistribution at the outset.” 
Comment HA K. py0 
Kim, Shim, and Kim’s paper reviews the past development policies taken by 
the Korean government in the context of new growth theory. In the first part 
of the paper, the authors emphasize the positive role played by the Korean 
government in accelerating human capital accumulation and promoting knowl- 
edge spillover through export promotion. In the second part, they discuss risk 
sharing between the government and firms in Korea and sectoral balance and 
redistribution policy during the period 1982-92 and attempt to draw the impli- 
cations of this changing policy direction to the future course of economic 
growth in Korea. The paper concludes by arguing that industrial policies need 
to be designed along with a pie-splitting arrangement at the outset. 
The linkage of the first part to endogenous growth models is straightforward. 
However, the paper lacks a statistically meaningful analysis of how the Korean 
government initiated investment in both education and export industries in the 
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early period of economic development with scarce resources. The question 
remains as to why only Korea and Taiwan succeeded while many other devel- 
oping countries failed. What was the nature of Korea’s endowed human capital 
at the beginning of economic development? 
In addition, the authors need to update their literature survey with both new 
growth-theoretic empirical studies such as Sengupta (1991, 1993) and more 
recent growth accounting results on Korean data such as Kim and Park (1988) 
and Pyo et al. (1993). An empirical analysis of human capital accumulation 
and on-the-job training at the industry level or firm level would greatly 
strengthen the authors’ argument. 
The main problem I find with the paper is its second part. The linkage of 
the analysis to endogenous growth theories is ambiguous and confusing. The 
authors need to explain how risk sharing between the government and firms 
and the redistribution policy recently pursued by the Korean government 
would fit into the framework of new growth models. There are neither theoreti- 
cal explanations nor empirical references in the paper. 
For example, the authors claim that the government should establish at the 
initial stage a transparent system of fair distribution of returns realized from 
the selected projects. I cannot find any endogenous growth theory which ad- 
dresses this dilemma-the government selecting projects while ensuring a fair 
distribution scheme. At the end of the paper, they also argue that government 
support should be financed from the budget, minimizing as much as possible 
the risk of rent seeking by interest groups. They need to explain why budget 
financing necessarily minimizes the risk of rent seeking and, if so, how it fits 
into the framework of endogenous growth theories. 
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